Arakhin ערכין

Unlike most of the order of Kodashim, which deals with offerings that are sacrificed on the altar, tractate Arakhin focuses on vows that are taken for the sake of Heaven, i.e., vows for donations intended for Temple maintenance. The halakhot of these vows are based on Leviticus, chapter 27, which uses the term erekh in this connection, and the term appears in II Kings 12:5 as well.

A person might be motivated to vow by a moment of crisis or salvation. In such circumstances, he vows as a sign of gratitude for the fact that he, or someone dear to him, was saved. Alternatively, he might feel the desire to donate the value of his life as a form of atonement. This valuation can take various forms. Some types of valuation can be quantified, e.g., the market value of a certain person as a slave, but most valuations are not quantifiable in monetary terms. One certainly cannot place a price on a human life. Nevertheless, the Torah established fixed amounts for such valuations, in accordance with the age and sex of the person who was valuated (Leviticus 27:1-7), with the age ranges being: One month to five years old, five years old to twenty, twenty to sixty, and over sixty. Such vows are referred to as vows of valuation, or simply as valuations. The first part of this tractate explores the precise definitions of the principles and details of this halakha. While discussing vows of valuation, the Gemara also addresses the broader topic of consecrated property in general. It clarifies how these obligations are evaluated and how they are collected in practice. The halakhot pertaining to items after they are consecrated are elucidated in tractate Me'ila.

The fixed valuations do not apply in cases where a person takes a standard vow. For example, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to pay the assessment of so-and-so, he must pay that person's market value to the Temple treasury. The same is true if one obligated himself to pay an amount equivalent to his weight or the weight of another. The Sages refer to these as vows of assessment, or simply as assessments. These types of vows are not limited to the monetary value of human beings; a person may obligate himself to pay the value of an animal or any other item. The tractate discusses how the amounts of these vows are calculated.

A central focus in this tractate is the relationship between valuations and assessments, and the Gemara must determine what the two concepts have in common and where they differ.

These differences are largely due to the following basic distinction: Whereas assessments are determined by the actual worth of the person or item that the individual specified, valuations are a function of a system of categories defined by the Torah. Therefore, assessments depend on the intent of the person who took the vow and the actual value of the person or item whose worth he undertook to pay. By contrast, valuations are determined entirely by the Torah's definitions, regardless of the actual monetary value of the object of his vow. For example, the assessment of a newborn is effective, whereas a person who valuated a newborn is exempt. The reason is that a newborn is not included in any of the categories of valuation, and therefore valuating a newborn is devoid of meaning. Likewise, one can assess his hand, but not valuate it. Conversely, one who is afflicted with boils can be valuated, as he fits into an age and sex category defined in the Torah, but he cannot be assessed, as he has no monetary value.

Another aspect of this distinction is the pertinent timeframe for the obligation in each case. With regard to assessments, the decisive moment is the evaluation of the person's monetary value. Therefore, if the one whose value was the object of a vow died before he could be evaluated, the person who took the vow is exempt. By contrast, in the case of valuation the obligation exists from the time of the vow, even if the individual who was valuated subsequently dies.

Another distinction between assessment and valuation is the halakha of payment based on affordability. Normally, one who takes a vow that obligates him monetarily to the Temple treasury must pay the full amount to which he committed himself. Not even the priest who is the treasurer of the Temple treasury has the authority to provide the one who vowed with any dispensation, as this is an obligation to God. By contrast, the Torah stipulates that in the case of valuations, if the person who took the vow cannot afford the standard valuation, the priest sets an alternative valuation in accordance with his means. This is a function of the fact that the obligation is determined by an amount fixed by the Torah; the valuation of the priest is considered part of this determination.

Notwithstanding the fundamental distinctions between them, assessments and valuations share certain common aspects as well. This stems from the fact that they are both types of vows of consecration. The common aspects are as follows: First, just as one may request the dissolution of a standard vow, one may also seek the dissolution of a vow of consecration, whether of assessment or of valuation. Second, in both cases the priest, as a representative of the Temple treasury, is the one authorized to evaluate the obligation. Third, both in terms of deciding the financial status of the person who took the vow of valuation and for establishing the value of the item being assessed, the determination is based solely on the current location and time. Consequently, the court does not take into account the possibility that the item might be worth more elsewhere, or that the person who took the vow of valuation could become more prosperous. Another detail the two types of vow share is the halakha that the vow is assessed by the significance of the body part that was mentioned. In other words, if one vowed to consecrate the valuation or assessment of a vital organ, he must pay the valuation or assessment of the entire person or animal.

This tractate also treats the collection of an obligation that a person vowed, as it was often necessary for the Temple treasury to collect payment from the person who took the vow. If he did not have the money to pay, it was collected from his property. The Sages derived from the verses that when one's property is collected, he is to be left with minimal necessities, including specific tools required to earn his livelihood. Occasionally, when the Temple treasury attempted to collect a person's property, whether in his lifetime or posthumously, there would be a prior lien on the property due to a debt or a marriage contract. In such cases, concerns might arise of possible collusions against the Temple treasury, or other potential mishaps, such as observers mistakenly concluding that consecrated property can be removed from the ownership of the Temple treasury without redemption. The Sages instituted various decrees to address these complications.

The tractate also analyzes dedications, which are a special type of consecration. Normally, property that is consecrated is meant to be redeemed, typically by the person who consecrated the property. This is because the Temple treasury has no use for the property itself. By contrast, a dedication is fundamentally the act of rendering an item stringently forbidden, by removing it entirely from the realm of non-sacred property. The Torah distinguishes between property dedicated for the sake of Heaven and property dedicated to the priests. Some hold that if one did not specify which type of dedication he meant, it is dedicated to the priests. The mishna clarifies that in terms of vows of consecration for the sake of Heaven there is no distinction between a formulation of ordinary consecration and one of dedication; in both instances the property is subject to redemption. By contrast, property dedicated to the priests is not subject to redemption and is forever lost to its original owner.

The Sages taught, based on the verses, that one may not dedicate all of his property but must leave over a portion of each category of his property for himself. Accordingly, they state that one certainly should not give away all of his property to charity. One's property is a gift from God, and he should not leave himself dependent on others.

The second half of the tractate deals with a unique form of consecration, that of an ancestral field, i.e., one's family inheritance in Eretz Yisrael. One may redeem his ancestral field at any point until the Jubilee Year. If he did not redeem it before the Jubilee Year, the field is turned over to the priests and is permanently lost to the original owner. Here, as in the case of valuations, the cost of redeeming the field is fixed by the Torah and does not depend on its actual value. It is also possible to consecrate a purchased field. This tractate clarifies the distinctions between these two types of consecration and the methods of their redemption.

Apropos the discussion of consecrating fields, the tractate also considers the sale of fields and houses in Eretz Yisrael. The common denominator between these cases is that they both apply when the halakhot of the Jubilee Year are in effect, i.e., when all of the Jewish people dwell in their inheritance. These halakhot reflect the general aim of discouraging people from selling their ancestral inheritance in Eretz Yisrael, and for this reason, the original owner may redeem the property. Nevertheless, there are some limitations, in order to allow for the realistic sale of land. Despite these shared aspects of a sale and of consecration, there is an important distinction between them. If one sells his land and does not redeem it, it nevertheless returns to him in the Jubilee Year. Conversely, if he consecrates it and does not redeem it by the Jubilee Year, he loses it permanently and it becomes the property of the priests.

The transfer of land to the priests in the Jubilee Year is one of the gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, as they receive their portion from the table of God and do not have their own inheritance in Eretz Yisrael. The Torah grants a further benefit to the priests and Levites in that they may sell property, consecrate it, and redeem it from the buyer or the Temple treasury at any time.

These are the main issues discussed in tractate Arakhin. Other topics are reviewed tangentially, some of which are related to the halakhot of consecrating and redeeming property. Additional statements are cited due to the linguistic or conceptual similarity between them and the mishnayot that establish the halakhot of valuations.

This tractate consists of nine chapters:

Chapter One examines the definition of who can valuate and who is subject to valuation.

Chapter Two begins with the topic of valuations. It continues with a series of sundry topics that are treated with the formulation: Not less than...and not more than. The chapter includes a basic review of the halakhot of song in the Temple service.

Chapter Three enumerates various matters for which the Torah provides a set amount, regardless of stringency or leniency.

Chapter Four details the halakhot of valuations, particularly the issue of determination based on affordability.

Chapter Five considers vows of consecration and the method of the collection of these obligations.

Chapter Six explicates the method of evaluating and collecting land as payment of vows of consecration.

Chapter Seven focuses on the consecration of an ancestral field and its redemption.

Chapter Eight addresses the redemption of a consecrated field during the periods when the Jubilee Year is not in effect. It also discusses the halakhot of dedications.

Finally, Chapter Nine determines the halakhot that govern the sale of ancestral fields, of houses of walled cities, and of houses of unwalled courtyards.