Meilah מעילה

Me'ila is the last tractate of the Talmud in the order of Kodashim. It may be noted parenthetically that the early commentaries already suggest that tractate Tamid, which is presented in the format of the tractates of Babylonian Talmud, is not actually part of the main body of the Talmud but is an addition to it.

Me'ila is included in Kodashim due to two aspects of the halakhot of me'ila, or misuse of consecrated property: First, the prohibition of me'ila involves property that is dedicated to the Sanctuary. Second, one who violates this prohibition is obligated to bring a guilt offering to the Temple.

The prohibition against misusing consecrated property is expressed in the Torah in a brief section consisting of only two verses: “If anyone commits a trespass and sins through error in the sacred items of the Lord, then he shall bring his forfeit to the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock, according to your valuation in silver by shekels, after the shekel of the Sanctuary, for a guilt offering. And he shall make restitution for that which he has sinned in the sacred item, and shall add its fifth part and give it to the priest; and the priest shall make atonement for him with the ram of the guilt offering, and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:15-16). These verses deal only with the punishment for misusing consecrated property; the source of the prohibition is a matter of dispute among the early commentaries. Some derive the prohibition from the verse: “You may not eat within your gates...nor any of your vows that you vow, nor your gift offerings, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). This includes consuming or deriving benefit from consecrated property (Rambam; Sefer HaHinnukh). The Ra'avad maintains that the source is the verse: “And if a priest's daughter be married to a common man, she shall not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred” (Leviticus 22:12). This prohibition against misusing consecrated property is described in the Torah by the word me'ila (see Leviticus 5:15). This term refers to changing the domain of the consecrated property, by removing it from the domain of the sacred, i.e., the Temple treasury, to the non-sacred property of an ordinary person. The term is used in a similar manner in connection with the most severe of sins, idol worship and adultery (see 18a). It is also used in reference to betrayal or denial, as in the case of one who takes a false oath denying possession of a deposit, which is mentioned alongside the passage dealing with misuse of consecrated property: “If anyone sins, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and deals falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge” (Leviticus 5:21).

As indicated by the verse “If any one commits a trespass and sins through error in the sacred items of the Lord,” this halakha applies only in a case of unwitting transgression. If one intentionally misuses consecrated property, although he is obligated to repay the Temple treasury, he does not have the ability to achieve atonement through the process that is delineated in this section of the Torah. The Sages disagree with regard to the precise consequences of his actions (see Sanhedrin 83a). It is also clear from these verses that this halakha applies only to items defined as “the sacred items of the Lord.” There are two features of this category, one of which is expansive while the other is restrictive. On the one hand, the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property applies to any item that is consecrated. This includes offerings of all sorts, whether animal or flour, as well as property of the Temple treasury, i.e., consecrated items. On the other hand, the verse's formulation also restricts the category of misuse. Even offerings, or parts of offerings, are subject to the halakhot of misuse only if they are classified as “the sacred items of the Lord.” If they become the property of regular people, such as the owners or the priests, or if they become permitted to them, or, by contrast, if they are no longer fit for sacrifice, they are not subject to the halakhot of misuse. Consequently, offerings of lesser sanctity, which are considered the property of their owners, are not subject to the halakhot of misuse, except for the sacrificial portions, which are burned upon the altar after the sprinkling of the blood. This is derived from the verse: “All the fat is the Lord's” (Leviticus 3:16), which includes the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity in the halakhot of misuse (see 15a). Similarly, with regard to those offerings of the most sacred order whose meat is consumed, i.e., the sin offering and the guilt offering, the meat is not subject to the halakhot of misuse once the blood has been sprinkled, as that act renders the meat permitted. Likewise, the offerings of the most sacred order that are burned completely, e.g., the burnt offering and the meal offering of priests, are no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse once their mitzva has been performed.

The Torah describes the atonement for misuse of consecrated property in the verses cited above (Leviticus 5:15-16). These verses indicate that there are two aspects to the atonement process for misuse: Monetary restitution and a sacrificial offering. The offering is the guilt offering of misuse of consecrated property, which is a ram worth at least two shekels, a denomination referred to as a sela by the Sages. There are two components to the monetary restitution: The principal and the additional payment of one-fifth. The principal is the value of the benefit that one derived from the consecrated property, or the value of the loss that he caused. It should be noted that even those acts of misuse of consecrated property that involve deriving benefit from consecrated property also include an element of degrading the value of the sacred item. In this context, the early commentaries disagree with regard to the primary component of misuse. Some hold that the primary component is the degradation of the consecrated property (Rashi), while others maintain that the primary component is the benefit derived (Rambam). Yet others contend that it is a combination of the two (Tosafot). There is a fundamental principle which has ramifications for many different discussions in this tractate, that liability for misuse is limited to a case where the misuse involved at least the value of one peruta. The additional payment of one-fifth of the principal is calculated externally, i.e., it is one-fifth of the sum of the principal and the fifth combined, or one-fourth of the principal. For example, if the principal is forty perutot, the additional amount would be ten perutot, not eight; and therefore the total payment would be fifty perutot.

There are cases that are not subject to misuse by Torah law but which are subject to misuse by rabbinic law. The Sages were stringent because even in cases where there is no liability by Torah law, this exemption generally applies only to payment and the obligation to bring an offering. Even in those cases there is a prohibition by Torah law against deriving benefit from the consecrated property. There are also cases where there is no prohibition at all by Torah law and, nevertheless the Sages enacted a prohibition, due to the severity of deriving benefit from consecrated property. Surprisingly, the Sages applied some of these prohibitions even in cases that occur only infrequently. In situations where the liability for misuse applies by rabbinic law, one who violated the prohibition is obligated to pay the principal but not the additional one-fifth, and he is not required to bring an offering.

The prohibition against misuse is atypical in that, in contrast to almost all other transgressions, there is agency for transgression with regard to misuse. The principle is that if one instructs an agent to commit a transgression, that agent is liable rather than the one who dispatched him. But in the case of misuse, if one dispatched an agent with money that was consecrated, unbeknownst to either of them, and the agent used the money and it thereby left the possession of the Temple treasury, the one who dispatched him rather than the agent is liable (see 20a).

The limits of misuse of consecrated property are clearly defined, in that the prohibition applies specifically to items that are sacred. With regard to non-sacred items, the verse states: “And the earth He has given over to mankind” (Psalms 115:16). Nevertheless, the Sages stress that the entire world belongs to God, and therefore if one derives benefit from it without recognition and gratitude to God, this is similar to misuse of consecrated property. Therefore, they teach that it is prohibited to derive benefit from this world without reciting a blessing, and anyone who does so is considered as though he violated the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property (Berakhot 35a).

This tractate consists of six chapters, each of which focuses on a specific topic.

Chapter One examines the question of when offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity are and are not subject to the halakhot of misuse.

Chapter Two addresses the specifics of the halakhot of misuse with regard to different offerings.

Chapter Three clarifies which consecrated property is included in the halakhot of misuse, and which is not included; and in which of these cases there is, nevertheless, a prohibition against deriving benefit from such property.

Chapter Four deals primarily with the issue of different items combining to form the requisite measure for liability of misuse of consecrated property. The topic leads to a general discussion of combinations with regard to ritual impurity and various prohibitions.

Chapter Five discusses the definition of the basic acts of misuse: Deriving benefit from consecrated property, degradation of consecrated property, and removing the property from the domain of the Temple treasury to that of an ordinary person.

Chapter Six deals with cases of misuse where the prohibition is not violated directly by the owners, but by their agents or those in possession of the property as a deposit.

There is little in the way of aggadic material in this tractate. The rare instances of aggadic material are generally tangential to specific halakhic discussions.