Shevuot שבועות

Tractate Shevuot deals primarily with the halakhot of the various categories of oaths. The tractate is included in Seder Nezikin, the Order of Damages, because many of the categories of oaths, including oaths of testimony and oaths of judges, are used within a court setting as part of the judicial proceedings in order to establish a person's liability or lack thereof. As such, it is a logical continuation of tractate Sanhedrin. Indeed, in the mishnaic order it appears immediately after tractate Makkot, which is considered a direct continuation of tractate Sanhedrin. Nevertheless, tractate Shevuot also covers other categories of oaths, such as oaths on an utterance, which are not in any way connected to the judicial process. Also included in the tractate are various halakhot of offerings, which are more directly associated with tractate Zevahim but are included here in a tangential way.

The underlying concept of an oath is that a person can be relied upon to tell the truth when he takes an oath that a statement he says is true, specifically when he attests to his claim by taking the oath in God's name.

The violation of an oath is considered a particularly severe matter. Already in the Ten Commandments it is stated: “The Lord will not absolve one who raises His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7; Deuteronomy 5:11), which refers to one who takes an oath about an issue, the truth of which is patently obvious. The Sages (see Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 3:2) understand that this refers even to one who takes an oath truthfully about an obvious fact. If so, all the more so does one who takes a false oath commit a grave sin. Indeed, a large section of the tractate deals with the process of atonement for one who takes a false oath. The consequences for taking a false oath include both liability to bring an offering in the case of an unwitting violation, and, in certain instances, corporal punishment for an intentional transgression.

Many of the various categories of oaths are defined by the Torah, although there are additional categories that were devised by the Sages. A number of significant distinctions exist between oaths by Torah law and oaths by rabbinic law.

One category of oaths involves those that affect only the person taking the oath and do not relate to the property or actions of other people. This includes oaths on an utterance and oaths taken in vain.

An oath on an utterance is one in which a person takes an oath about an event, stating either that it took place or that it will take place. The oath can refer either to an action that one will perform or to one refraining from performing an action. If one takes a false oath about an event that has already happened, or about a reality that currently exists, then one immediately incurs liability. If one transgresses intentionally, and there are witnesses who had forewarned him, one is liable to receive lashes. If the violation was unwitting, then one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, either a sheep, bird, or meal-offering, depending on one's financial ability.

Oaths taken in vain are oaths from which nothing is to be gained because they relate to truths that are patently obvious. These include oaths that one takes in which one commits to perform an action that is impossible for him to perform, either because it is physically inconceivable or because doing so would be in violation of a prohibition; false oaths that a person takes in which one claims that a certain fact is true when it is obviously false; and oaths where a person attests to an obvious truth, e.g., where one takes an oath that the sun is the sun. One who intentionally takes an oath in vain is liable to receive lashes, but one who does so unwittingly is not liable at all.

A second class of oaths relate to financial matters that affect other people. These include an oath of testimony, an oath of a deposit, an oath of the judges, and an oath of the bailees.

An oath of testimony is taken in a case where a litigant claims that witnesses have information supporting his case and he requests that they testify on his behalf, and they deny that they have such information. If in such a case the witnesses take a false oath to that effect, and in actual fact they could have testified, thereby causing the litigant a loss, they are obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering to achieve atonement.

An oath of a deposit is relevant in a case where one owes another money or property and denies his liability, and takes an oath to that effect. This applies to any case in which the claimant had a financial right to the money, whether it is due to a loan, a deposit, or claims for damage, but it does not include a debt that is the result of a financial penalty placed upon the defendant. If after taking a false oath the defendant admits that he lied, he must repay his debt and add to it a surcharge of one-fifth of the principal's value. In addition, he must bring a ram as a guilt-offering to atone for his transgression.

An oath of the judges is similar to an oath of a deposit, in that one denies a debt that he owes someone and takes an oath to that effect. The difference is that this oath is administered by the court's judges and not by the claimant. This occurs when the claimant states that another owes him money but he has only one witness to support his claim, or when the defendant admits to part of the claim. In these cases the court judges will demand that the defendant take an oath to support his claim. This oath is taken while holding onto a scroll of the Torah or onto phylacteries. Once he takes the oath he is then exempt from having to pay. If he later admits that he took a false oath, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

An oath of a bailee is another oath taken in a case where one denies a financial obligation and takes an oath to that effect. It is taken when a bailee takes charge of an item but when the time comes to return it, he claims that some mishap occurred to the item for which he is exempt from any liability. In such a case the owner of the item can demand that the bailee take an oath affirming his claim. The main discussion of this oath is held in tractate Bava Metzia, but many of its halakhot are also discussed here.

In addition to the above-mentioned classes of oaths, which are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, the Sages instituted the taking of oaths in various other circumstances. A number of such oaths are already mentioned in the Mishna. The Mishna explains that in these specific cases, it is the claimant who is required to take an oath and then he is deemed credible to extract money from the defendant. This is in contrast to oaths by Torah law, in which it is always the defendant who takes an oath and is thereby exempted from liability. The reason for this distinction is that in the cases in which the Sages instituted the taking of oaths, there are strong grounds to believe the claimant. Nevertheless, the Sages insisted that before his claim is accepted, he must first reinforce his claim by taking an oath that it is true. Similarly, there are cases where even though the claimant does not state a definite claim, nevertheless, since there is basis to suspect that the defendant is liable, the Sages instituted that the defendant must pay unless he takes an oath that he is exempt.

During the period of the Gemara, the Sages instituted another type of oath, called an oath of inducement. This type of oath is required whenever one entirely denies a monetary claim presented against him. Since it was instituted later, there are various leniencies with regard to it.

An analysis of the various details concerning the different types of oaths, including their precise definitions, the circumstances in which they are taken, and the liability for their violation is the main focus of this tractate. In the course of these discussions the Gemara also raises other related subjects, including: The possibility to extend oaths and require one taking the oath to take an oath about additional matters; the ability to transfer an oath that one party was required to take onto the other party; and the fact that, in certain circumstances, the Sabbatical Year can cancel an obligation to take an oath.

The tractate opens with two chapters entirely unrelated to the halakhot of oaths. This is because the opening mishna formulates the various types of an oath on an utterance as: Two that are four, i.e., there are two types of oaths that can be further subdivided, for a total of four types. The mishna then goes on to list other sets of halakhot that can be formulated in this way and then proceeds, in the first two chapters of the tractate, to examine them. Though thematically, Seder Teharot or Seder Kodashim might have been a more appropriate place to discuss these sets of halakhot, apparently no fitting place was found there, so the discussion is recorded here. The main focus of these examinations is the liability for defiling the Temple by entering it while one is ritually impure, and defiling its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while one is ritually impure. The liability for certain cases of these violations is mentioned in the Torah in the same passage that delineates one's liability for violating an oath of an utterance, and in both cases one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. These chapters detail all the situations in which violations can occur and how atonement is achieved for each of them, and then the discussion is expanded to include how atonement is achieved for all other transgressions.

Tractate Shevuot contains eight chapters, the majority of which primarily focus on and thoroughly examine a single topic, that of oaths.

Chapter One recounts which offerings atone for the various cases of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. The different cases are defined by when and if the transgressor was aware of the components of the violation.

Chapter Two delineates the precise definition of awareness with regard to one's liability for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, addresses which areas of the Temple are included, and sets out the halakhot of one who becomes ritually impure while inside the Temple.

Chapter Three discusses the halakhot of oaths on an utterance and oaths taken in vain.

Chapter Four addresses oaths of testimony, specifically, how they are administered and how one achieves atonement for having taken a false oath.

Chapter Five focuses on the oath of a deposit.

Chapter Six discusses oaths of the judges and deals primarily with an oath of one who admits to part of a claim.

Chapter Seven introduces the oaths that were instituted by the Sages, where it is the claimant who takes an oath reinforcing the truth of his claim and who may then take the defendant's money. The chapter also considers the possibility of transferring an oath from one party to another and extending oaths to force the one taking it to also take an oath about additional matters.

Chapter Eight delineates the various cases in which bailees must take oaths in which they state that they are exempt from liability.

The tractate includes very little aggadic material, and the little that it does contain focuses mainly on highlighting the gravity of taking false oaths.