Yevamot יבמות

Yevamot is the first tractate in the order of Nashim. Admittedly, some commentaries place Yevamot after Gittin (Meiri), but this is not widely accepted. While the tractate focuses mainly on the halakhot of levirate marriage, the elucidation of these halakhot necessitates an in-depth clarification of the halakhot of marriage in general. These include forbidden and disqualified marriages, i.e., those women with whom relations are forbidden with a certain man, whether by Torah law or by rabbinic law, as well as the definition and severity of these prohibitions. Consequently, the comprehensive discussions of tractate Yevamot form the basis of the entire order of Nashim.

As stated above, in addition to the halakhot of levirate marriage, this tractate serves as an important and sometimes the only source for various aspects of forbidden sexual relations, as well as the halakhot of converts and conversion, and the definition of separation between man and wife, which concerns mainly the halakhot of refusal and the case of a deserted wife. Many of these discussions are complemented in Kiddushin, the last tractate in Nashim.

The issue of levirate marriage is explicitly stated in the Torah in only one short passage (Deuteronomy 25:5–10). In addition, there are two episodes in the Bible that are connected to the idea of levirate marriage: The incident involving Judah, his sons, and Tamar (Genesis, chapter 38), and the marriage of Ruth and Boaz (Ruth, chapters 3–4). Both early and later commentaries discuss the relationship between these stories and the halakhot of levirate marriage set out in Deuteronomy. In any case, levirate marriage, as well as being a far-from-rare occurrence, is such a fundamental concept that an entire tractate is devoted its many details, on both the theoretical and the practical levels.

Levirate marriage is a novel halakha; see the Gemara on 17b. In other words, it deviates from the norms of the legal system of the Torah. Generally, one who engages in relations with the wife of his brother violates a severe prohibition that makes him liable to karet (Leviticus 18:16, 20:21). However, if this woman's husband dies childless, not only is she permitted to the brother, it is actually a mitzva for him to marry her. Since forbidden sexual relationships are among the most severe of Torah prohibitions, indeed one of the three cardinal sins for which one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress, the fact that one is permitted and even commanded to marry his brother's wife renders levirate marriage a highly exceptional case.

Several halakhic discussions in this tractate concern the basic question of whether the mitzva of levirate marriage merely overrides the prohibition with regard to a brother's wife to a limited extent, or whether, in these special circumstances, the prohibition does not apply at all. One of the ways the Sages express this dialectic tension is with the statement that the verses “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother's wife” (Leviticus 18:16) and “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) were pronounced together (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 3:5). According to this line of reasoning, it is incorrect to say that a forbidden sexual relationship is permitted in the case of levirate marriage. In fact, the opposite is the case: The mitzva of levirate marriage applies only when no prohibition is in effect. If a potential levirate marriage would violate any other forbidden sexual relationship apart from that of a brother's wife, not only is there no mitzva to marry the woman, the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply in this case at all and she is actually forbidden to the brother.

Levirate marriage is unique not only with regard to the performance of the mitzva itself, but also in the fact that the obligation can be released by the act of halitza. Typically, the Torah imposes either absolute obligations that every Jew must fulfill at all times, e.g., the love of God; or mitzvot that are incumbent upon certain people part of the time, such as donning phylacteries; or commandments that apply if particular conditions are met, e.g., the halakhot of commerce or ritual slaughtering. In all these cases, once the mitzva is in force, one cannot release himself from the obligation. By contrast, the option of halitza effectively provides the brother-in-law with the choice of whether or not he wants to perform levirate marriage. Consequently, the Sages apparently viewed halitza not as the negation of levirate marriage but as an alternative mitzva. Accordingly, the Torah allows the brother-in-law in this situation to select between two equivalent mitzvot. Some even maintain that halitza is preferable to levirate marriage; see 39b. This issue is also possibly connected to the debate in the Jerusalem Talmud as to whether halitza is itself a form of acquisition or simply an act that exempts the brother-in-law and releases the yevama.

With these points in mind, these mitzvot can be explained in the following terms. When a man dies childless, he leaves behind a void in a soul that was unable to come to full fruition in the world. Consequently, his surviving brother must replace him by marrying his widow. In this manner the surviving brother is considered to be continuing his late brother's life. For this reason, by Torah law there is no new ritual of betrothal or a wedding ceremony in the case of levirate marriage, as it carries on the previous bond. This consideration also affects the halakhot of inheritance and the marriage contract, among other matters. If the brother-in-law bears a child he is viewed as completing his brother's mission. See the Ramban's Commentary on the Torah with regard to both the episode of Judah and Tamar and the chapter on levirate marriage itself, where he discusses the fundamental idea of levirate marriages in light of these passages. Indeed, the story of Judah and Tamar, among other things, teaches the great responsibility of this task and the punishment of those who refuse to fulfill it in the proper manner. Conversely, halitza is essentially a ritual of atonement and purification, through which the brother-in-law and his yevama are released from their mutual bond and from the weighty obligation placed on their shoulders. Moreover, this is the means by which the life cycle of the deceased brother is brought to a close.

Another feature of levirate marriage is that in contrast to a regular marriage, in which the man chooses the woman he wishes to wed, the yevama and brother-in-law are tied together by a decree of the Torah. This connection, called by the Sages the levirate bond, is one of the central topics of the tractate. Some Sages view this link as merely an obligation to marry a particular woman, which in practical terms simply means that she is not permitted to marry anyone else until the obligation has been released by means of halitza. This opinion is expressed as: There is no bond. However, the halakha is that there is a bond, i.e., the link between a brother-in-law and a yevama is virtually akin to a marital bond, as she is considered betrothed to him to a certain extent. One of the ramifications of this ruling is that her close female relatives are forbidden to the brother-in-law.

In light of the above, to preserve the boundaries of modesty and to prevent any miscomprehension of the halakhot of marriage, the Sages enacted that a brother-in-law should perform an act of betrothal with his yevama. This is called a ma'amar, a levirate betrothal. Furthermore, if he gives her a bill of divorce while she is waiting for either levirate marriage or halitza, his act is effective to a certain extent. On the one hand, these rabbinic enactments draw levirate marriage closer to a regular marriage, but on the other hand they can cause many problems for the marriage and for halitza.

Likewise, other decrees of the Sages involving marriage, such as those concerning the marriage of a minor girl who is an orphan and the annulment of this tie by her refusal of her husband, as well as the marriage of deaf-mutes, also complicate the halakhot of levirate marriage, despite the fact that these enactments serve the public welfare. Some of these prohibitions stem from sanctity, i.e., they were enacted in order to preserve the sanctity of the Jewish people or the priesthood, and some of them apply to the entire people, such as having a sexual relationship with a mamzer or a man with crushed genitals or other genital wounds, or with converts from different nations. Other forbidden sexual relationships are secondary forbidden relatives prohibited by rabbinic law. All these cases require not only a thorough analysis on their own account, but they must be properly defined before one can establish the relationship between these marriages and levirate marriage, which applies by Torah law. This matter concerns the validity of levirate marriage and halitza, the whole range of monetary issues that arise with regard to inheritance and the marriage contract, and the concomitant prohibitions and rights, e.g., the permission to partake of teruma and the conditions of the marriage contract.

Furthermore, numerous other problems with levirate marriage can result from various causes, either due to complicated family relationships, e.g., if the yevama is permitted to only one of several brothers, or if a few deaths occur in succession, or because of factual or halakhic uncertainties. These might be doubts with regard to the halakhic and family status of a certain person, or unclear and possibly erroneous testimony concerning someone's death.

The debates and analysis of all these problems, both separately and in various combinations, is why tractate Yevamot is considered one of the hardest, most complex tractates in the entire Talmud.

Tractate Yevamot is comprised of sixteen chapters. Some deal with one clearly defined topic, while others discuss several issues spread over different chapters.

Chapter One focuses on the halakhot of women to whom the duty of levirate marriage does not apply, either because they are among those with whom relations are forbidden or for some other reason. Additionally, the chapter discusses the basic halakhic principles of when one mitzva overrides another.

Chapter Two deals with the prohibition with regard to the wife of a brother with whom the yavam did not coexist. It also discusses the basic principles of the types of women who are obligated in levirate marriages, and those who have no option but to perform halitza due to a prohibition that would be violated by a sexual relationship; whether it is a definite or an uncertain prohibition, and whether it applies by Torah law or by rabbinic law.

Chapter Three discusses those cases in which women who are relatives of each other are liable in levirate marriage, as well as a woman who is bound by an obligation of levirate marriage with two brothers.

Chapter Four contains many topics: The case of erroneous halitza and levirate marriage, the halakhot of inheritance and the marriage contract of a brother-in-law and his yevama, the basic definitions of mamzer status, and the halakhot of conversion.

Chapter Five discusses a single issue: The validity of a levirate betrothal [ma'amar] and the bill of divorce of a brother-in-law to his yevama, including all various permutations and combinations of these actions.

Chapter Six deals with the definition and halakhot of the act of intercourse, particularly with regard to a yevama, but also as it concerns marital relations in general. A portion of the chapter also discusses the prohibitions that apply only to priests, specifically to the High Priest, and the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply.

Chapter Seven focuses on the halakhot of partaking of teruma as they apply to the daughter or the wife of a priest, and those actions that disqualify them from eating teruma.

Chapter Eight discusses physical blemishes, particularly genital defects. These have ramifications with regard to eating teruma, permitted sexual relations, and the definition of a eunuch and a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], statuses that affect their eligibility for levirate marriage, among other matters.

Chapter Nine provides a list of women who are forbidden to a husband, a yavam, or both. It also discusses the halakhot of those who are permitted to partake of teruma due to their marriage.

Chapter Ten debates the range of problems that can result from an erroneous rumor of the death of a wife or a husband. These reports can cause complications if the surviving member of the couple remarries under these false pretenses.

Chapter Eleven focuses mainly on doubtful familial relationships, e.g., babies who were mixed up with each other, and the relationship status of a family that converted together.

Chapter Twelve deals with the halakhot of halitza; how, when, and in whose presence this ritual is performed. It also defines the shoe used for halitza and discusses other aspects of the ritual.

Chapter Thirteen focuses mainly on issues that arise from problematic marriages, e.g., the marriage of a minor girl and its annulment through refusal; and the broader topic of the marriage of incompetents, such as minors, deaf-mutes, and imbeciles.

Chapter Fourteen is concerned with the marriage of deaf-mutes and its halakhic status, both concerning the rights ensuing from marriage and the possibility of levirate marriage.

Chapter Fifteen concentrates on the status and reliability of various forms of testimony concerning the death of a husband.

Chapter Sixteen discusses the circumstances in which one may rely on testimony that a husband is dead, what the witnesses must say for their account to be accepted, and when one can rely on rumors and invalid witnesses in these cases.